Published on January 24, 2005 By O G San In International


At the top of the Newtownards Road in east Belfast stretches one of the longest murals in Northern Ireland (NI), a collection of street art celebrating loyalist paramilitarism which encompasses an entire block. Alongside the predictable images of masked gunmen, there are some more unusual touches like the attempt to claim the Declaration of Arbroath and the legendary figure Cuchulainn as loyalist symbols.

At one point, if you look closely you can see a crest bearing the legend "their only crime is loyality", a mis-spelling of a popular UDA slogan. When I noticed this, I thought it was instructive that the spelling mistake had never been corrected. Had it been a republican mural, the error would have been rectified as soon as it was noticed.

But what did this mis-spelling street artist mean by "loyality"? Many in the north of both religions would agree that the slogan should be reversed: "their only loyalty is crime", in reference to the UDA's racketeering and drug dealing. But on a more general level, what does loyalism mean?

Unoinists have always maintained that their loyalty is to the Bristish state, the Protestant crown, rather than to the British government of the day. For unionists, the monarchy is the institution which holds the very different peoples of the United Kingdom together.

But while loudly professing their loyalty to Queen Elizabeth the Second, unionists have frequently found themselves in conflict with the government that rules in her name. There is no necessary inconsistency here. Those who vote Conservative in England are not thought of as "disloyal" because they object to the current Labour government. A Democrat in the United States is no less American because of their oppostion to the current Republican administration.

The problem with unionist "loyalty" however is that, unlike Conservative voters in contemporary Britain, unionist opposition to certain British policies has sometimes gone well beyond mere dissent, into a murky area somewhere between defiance and outright rebellion.

In 1974 a large proportion of the unionist population of the north went on strike in an attempt to bring down the power-sharing executive. Loyalist paramilitary intimidation played a pivotal role in the success of the work stoppage.

In the wake of the Anglo-Irish Agreement ten years later, much of the unionist community launched a campaign of civil unrest, again involving loyalist violence, in an effort to collapse the new modus vivendi between the governments in London and Dublin.

Ten years after that NI was twice gripped by chaos as many unionists protested the decision to re-route a controversial Orange paarde away from a Catholic area. For several days in 1996 and again in 1998 there was in effect no law in NI, as the road blockers dictated the rythmn of life for hundreds of thousands of people.

Perhaps it is possible for unionists to defend all of these actions and still claim to be loyal. However it should be noted that in each case they were acting, often illegally, to thwart a policy of Her Majesty's Government which was being executed within the law.

For me though, the idea of unionists being loyal subjects collapses altogether when one considers the actions of northern Protestants in the period 1912-14. During this time most of the Protestant population of what was to become NI signed a covenant to resist Irish self-governemnt - "rule from Dublin" - by force if necessary. A large illegal military organisation the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) was set up to give meaning to this threat

This was not just a violent protest against a policy of the British government, this was a very real threat of rebellion. And what an important threat it turned out to be. There is no single reason that Ireland was partitioned in 1920, but the determination of Protestants in the north to fight "their" goivernment rather than accept Home Rule must rank high on any list. In other words NI, the state created for the "loyalists" of Ireland was bult on the back of the threat of mass treason by these self-same "loyalists".

To consider this part of history and then speak of loyalty to the crown, to Britain, is mistaken. Throughout our history, Protestants in the north of Ireland have demonstrated only one loyalty with consistently - to themselves. When British policy ran counter to unionist interest, unionists have not hesitated to resist, often violently, against Her Majesty's Government and the Crown Forces.

As a nationalist, it would be easy for me to despair at this, to believe that my co-religionists will bever accept a united Ireland, that they will "line the last ditch" should the British government ever try to impose unity upon them. Yet rather than being discouraged, I see opportunity in the fact that unionists act in their own self-interest, rather than being guided by some inflexible loyalty to a symbol.

This fickleness of "loyalty" to the symbol of the crown is based on the fact that unionism is not about being British, it's about not being Irish. Unionism is not primarily based on loylaty to Britain, but rather on fear of domination by the Catholic majority in a united Ireland. For unionists membership of the UK is not clung to so tenaciously because of a feeling of deep affinity with Britain, but rather from a cold calculation of self-interest.

Let me be clear that many unionists actively dislike the people of "the mainland", especially the English. For many loyalists the British are summed up by a number of stereotypes, none of them positive. Godless, weak-willed, appeasers of the IRA, ignorant, arrogant and duplicitious, this is how many unionists see their Britsh "brethren". For a lot of Protestants in the north, perfidious Albion is always plotting to "sell Ulster down the river". This is the rich electoral seam which Ian Paisley ha\s mined for more than three decades.

Perversely, the more "loyal" a person claims ro be, the more likely they are to hate the British. A middle-of-the-road unionist in Bangor may look fondly on the English and despair at what they think of her. A die-hard loyalist in Ballybeen though, may detest the English and take great pleasure in not caring what they think of her.

For nationalists, the task is clear. Unionists must be persuaded that a united Ireland is in the best interests of the Protestant people. If this can be achieved, then the link with the reviled British can be severed. "Loyalty" to the crown, no matter how loudly it is professed today, is in fact no real obstacle to Irish unity.

But to persuade unionists to embrace Irish unity, to become nationalists, would seem to be an impossible task, akin to asking Palestinians to become Zionists. Nevertheless I feel that, very slowly, this is happening, that history is flowing in my direction. The number of Protestant who, like me, actively support the idea of unity is still minscule, but it is growing.

Changes in the south in the last decade have a lot to do with this. Until the early 90s, when unionists looked south they found plenty to confirm their opposition to rule from Dublin. Until the last ten years, the south was a poor and overly religious state. Now however the Republc is one of Europe's richest countries, becoming more secular with each passing year. Some unoinists have started to reconsider their attiitude to Irish unity as a result. The old crude unionist stereotypes about bad roads and over-mighty clergy no longer hold water.

The key for future growth in Protestant nationalism though is to be found in the north rather than the south. If Protestant support for a united Ireland is to continue growing it is vital that republican paramilitary groups remain on ceasefire (however imperfect these may be).

The 1968 Rose Survey found that 20% of Protestants described themselves as "Irish", a substantial proportion. Within a year of the survey being published though, the Troubles had begun and the IRA had launched its long war to unify Ireland through violence. The significant Irish identity within the Protestant community was one of the Troubles' earliest victims.

It is not difficult to see why. Many of the IRA's victims were memebrs of the local police force and military, which were overwhelmingly Protestant. The Provos also carried out attacks which were nakedly sectarian in nature. To cite just the most infamous of many incidents, in 1987 the IRA blew up the cenotaph in Enniskillen on Remeberance Sunday, killing 12 people. For those unanware of the signifiacance of this day for Protestants, a fair paralell would be blowing up a synagogue on Yom Kippur.

The IRA's campaign to unify Ireland actually made unity far more difficult by embittering Protestants to the idea. How could if be any different? It hardly seems likely that someone would think:

"Well, I used to be against a united Ireland but then the IRA killed my brother-in-law and now I'm all in favour. The sister's not convinced yet but I'm sure I'll win her round when she has time to think it through. She's been a bit busy lately you see, what with all the hysterical screaming and that."

However, if the days of trying to unify the island through force are over, then the task of persuading unionists that their best future lies in a united Ireland becomes easier. Not easy, by any manner of means, but easier. Perhaps one day, the people of the Newtonards Road will feel moved to give artistic expression to their "loyality" to the Irish state.

It's not impossible.

Comments
on Jan 24, 2005
Interesting article.

I too would agree that the bridge between unionism and a united Ireland is not actually as large as it may appear. One of the fundamental things which I realised over the years is that the vast majority of unionists have no problem with the Irish in general, just with the nationalists in the north. This was once made clear to me when a university friend commented that unionists would happily join a united Ireland tomorrow if the nationalists were not included. He stressed that their problem was one of trusting their neighbours not of trusting Irish people in the Republic. Fear of the Nationalists in the North sharing power with a government in the south and diminishing Unionism was what they were afraid of. Years of hatred between the communities of the north have raised these barriers that are so very hard to overcome.

Should they find peace among themselves then they are far more likely to wish to integrate with the south than the mainland. How to make peace with themselves when they don't trust each other enough to share power is the problem though.

paul.